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Financial Deregulation: It's Been Good for Us,
But What Has It All Been About
And, Is It Over?
"
By John O. Bornhofen
Financial deregulation could turn out
to be a will-d -the wisp. By the time, many
figure out what is happening, it could be
over, and there could be talk of reregula
tion. Let's look back to see what finan
cial deregulation was, why it occurred,
and what is left.
Only ten years ago, if you wanted a
safe, relatively liquid, interest-bearing as
set for reserves, you went to your local
bank or savings and loan association and
received 5 or 5.5% in a passbook sav
ings account. Now, however, there are
any number of financial institutions with
which to deal, and there is a large array
of possible instruments, each with its own
interest rate.
A number of forces have converged
on the banking and financial systems in
the last 10-15 years, and while they often
go under the rubric "deregulation;' dereg
ulation was really the follower of these
events rather than the leader. Deregula
tion meant that the Federal government
and its agencies loosened control over
depository financial institutions (OFl's)
such as commercial banks and thrift in
stitutions (savings and loans and mutual
savings banks) and allowed them to
engage in business practices that they
were not authorized to do before-setting
price structures, raising funds from dif
ferent sources, developing new "prod
ucts" and moving into different markets.
Prior to these developments, banks
and thrifts had been among the most
regulated businesses. For the past ten
years or so, however, this has been chang
ing. Why did the government loosen its
grip on what OFf's could or could not do?
Power is not given up lightly.

Why Deregulation Happened
It was not out of the goodness of their
hearts that government bureaucrats final
ly said, "Let the market do it." It was a
set of circumstances that came together
and brought home that message. What
were these circumstances?
The forces that brought about the
massive change we have seen in the
financial system, and that we loosely refer
to as deregulation, were the products of
the 1970's and early 1980's: high and ris-

ing inflation, high and volatile interest
rates, technological change, institutional
change, increased competition, and in
creased financial sophistication on the
part of consumers. To be sure, one could
argue that the increased financial sophis
tication was brought about, to some extent,
by the other forces-was, indeed, made
necessary by them. Nonetheless, these
other influences were very real and very
powerful.
Throughout the post-war period, com
puters, perhaps the epitome of techno
logical change, were improving rapidly in
capacity and speed and declining in price.
Their impact was increasingly felt in the
financial system, where the need was
heaviest for the ability to store large

This volatile, unprecedented inflation
brought about and was mirrored in similar
behavior in interest rates. Treasury-bill
rates rose from 5% in early 1977 to over
15% in 1980. After falling back sharply
to 7% for a very brief period in the mid
1980's, Treasury-bill rates peaked at over
16% in 1981.
As if the volatility of interest rates (and
of stock and bond prices, for that matter)
wasn't enough, much of the period since
the late 1960's on saw interest rates on
highly liqUid, short-term, safe securities,
like U.S. Treasury bills exceed the max
imum rates the Government agencies
allowed the banks and thrifts to pay on
savings accounts. At times, the margin
was ten percentage points. Those max-

Why did the government loosen its grip on what
DFl's could or could not do?
Power is not given up lightly.
amounts of data and swap it between ac
counts. This development eventually led
to the introduction of accounts at DFI's,
whereby depOSitors maintained zero
balances in their checking accounts until
checks were presented for collection. At
that point, the computer moved the
depositor's funds out of interest-bearing
savings and into the checking account in
the right amount at the right time to cover
checks presently against the account.
This was the NOW account-Negotiable
Order of Withdrawal account. It was, in
fact, an interest-bearing checking ac
count. It was something that banks had
not been legally able to offer since the
Banking Act of 1935. This development
made some deregulation inevitable.

The Inflation Roller Coaster
But there were other forces at work as
well. Inflation, for instance, increased to
over 12% in 1974, then fell to 4.8% in
1976, and accelerated back up to over
13% in 1979. It has since fallen to less
than 4%. This inflation roller coaster brought
about massive change in the financial sys
tem as well as in other parts of the econ
omy as people attempted to protect their
assets and incomes from being ravaged.

imum rates became known as Regulation
Q because they fell under the Federal
Reserve's Regulation Q.
The high money market rates, former
ly available only to big investors, prompt
ed small savers to get a piece of the ac
tion. As expected, the market respond
ed. Not only did new types of depOSits
and securities appear but new institutions
emerged as well. Money market mutual
funds came on the financial scene and
prOVided savers with convenient, safe, li
qUid ways to earn the high rates on T
bills, certificates of deposit, commercial
paper, and other short-term securities,
which heretofore small savers otherwise
couldn't touch due to the high denomina
tions involved (usually $100,000 and up).

From Savings Accounts
To Money Market Accounts
Not surprisingly, savers reacted to the
high rates and new alternatives by pull
ing funds out of low-yielding savings ac
counts in OFl's in droves. This became
known as "disintermediation;' and it oc
curred every time market Interest rates
went significantly above the Regulation
Q ceiling rates. A major part of these
continued on page 6
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withdrawals went to the "money funds:'
Balances in money-market funds shot up
from less than $4 billion in 1977 to well
over $200 billion in 1982. Finally, the
complaints of banks and thrifts were
heard by the regulators, and in 1982 they
allowed the DF1's to offer their own brand
new Money Market Deposit Accounts
(MMDA's) on which they could pay the
higher market rates and attract deposits.
That deregulation was in the form of a
new Federal law-the Garn-Sf. Germain
Act of 1982. Balances in MMDA's prompt
ly went from zero in August 1982 to over
$320 billion by the end of March 1983
-a massive consumer response to the
most successful financial innovation ever.
The 1982 Act also authorized savings and
loans to accept deposits from, and make
loans to, businesses, and it allowed the
thrift institutions to increase their con
sumer lending.
The gyrations and record levels of in
terest rates alarmed consumers and busi
nesses alike, and by the time the prime
rate passed 19% in late 1979, almost
everyone, both in and out of government,
decided that something had to be done.
What had to happen, among other
things, was deregulation. This process of
financial reform that had been in progress
for several years culminated in the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA).
DIDMCA was the most massive change
in our financial structure since the bank
ing reforms of the early 1930's. Among
other things, it mandated the phasing-out
of all interest rate ceilings on all deposits
at DF1's by April 1986. It authorized NOW
accounts on a nationwide basis for all
DFI's. And it pre-exempted or wiped out
state usury laws on consumer-type and
mortgage loans unless the states affected
specifically re-enacted the laws. And
there was still more deregulation.
In 1983, interest rate ceilings were
removed from the rest of the time de
posits at DFl's, and super NOW's came
in. The latter carry market rates and have
unlimited checking privileges but can
have relatively high minimum balances.

Competition in the Market
Another force working for deregula
tion at times, but resulting from deregula
tion at other times, was increased com
petition in the various financial markets.
Other companies invaded the banking
field. The cash management account
(CMA) at brokerage firms is a prime ex

ample. Soon, banks decided they too
wanted to be brokers, as did S & I..:s.
Then some S & I..:s decided to become
banks, and some banks wanted to ac
quire insurance companies. It seemed
that every financial institution wanted to
offer every financial service, a far cry from
the days when only banks issued check
ing accounts and made unsecured busi
ness loans, and S & I..:s issued only sav
ings accounts and made home mortgage
loans. And that wasn't aiL Non-finimcial
companies wanted a piece of the finan
cial action. Sears got into brokerage, and
a steel company got into banking. In
short, the financial players all wanted to
play in each other's back yard:
The next big move was to open up
shop in someone else's market, some
times even crossing state lines-another
taboo that banks and S & I..:s had lived
with for years. The regulatory restraints
on interstate banking started to crumble,
a Process which is still going on..
The factors we have cited have forced
massive change on the financial system
-in fact, the largest since the cataclysmic
changes that took place after the collapse
of the financial system in the early 1930's
in the early years of the Depression.
Then, in response to the thousands of
banks and other financial institutions that
went under, Congress enacted laws and
formed agencies and programs to correct
the problems that supposedly led up to
the crash, and to prevent its reoccurrence.

Summary of Change
Eventually, it was these reforms that
put the DFl's into the straitjackets that
finally were broken a half century later by
the forces cited above: high and volatile
inflation and interest rates, technological
change, increased competition, and in
stitutional change. In time, the banks and
thrifts found that they had to avoid and
circumvent government regulations or be
left behind to stagnate. The combination
of these events forced the hand of the
government regulators, and what unfold
ed was deregulation.
The reduction in the heavy hand of
government regulation came sporadically
and in several forms. There was deregula
tion of pricing, of products offered, and
of entry into geographical markets. Pric
ing deregulation means the removal of
many of the interest rate ceilings DFl's
paid on depOSits and charged on loans.
Although some state usury laws still re
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main, all Federal interest rate ceilings wer"
done away with in April 1986. Individ~
als can now receive, and pay, rates set by
the market rather than by government
agencies.
The products of DFI's are primarily the
types of loans they make and the types
of deposits they accept. While banks have
had wide asset powers for years and have
made most kinds of loans-from con
sumer loans, to business, agricultural, and
security loans-the thrifts, especially the
S & I..:s, had very restricted loan powers.
That has now changed. They too can
make many types of consumer and
business loans as well as their traditional
fixed-rate home mortgage loans. In some
states, S & I..:s have wider asset powers
than do commercial banks.
On the deposit side, there have been
changes too. Both kinds of DFI's can now
offer many types of depOSits that didn't
exist a dozen years ago. Today there are
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal, NOW
accounts, Super-NOW's, MMDA's and
time deposits with numerous maturities
up to eight years and more. The thrifts
can also now offer checking accounts tqA
the pUblic.
.,
Geographical and market deregulation
has come more slowly and more sporad
ically than the other types, but it has been
equally complex. Many of the geograph
ical and market entries have been through
merger, whereby a bank or S & L in one
state buys a bank or S & L in another
state. But the action hasn't been limited
to mergers among like institutions. Banks
have acquired S & I..:s and S & I..:s have
acquired banks, and both have been ac
quired by companies that are neither
banks nor thrifts.

The Future of Deregulation
There is one strand left in the fabric of
deregulation. That is nationwide banking.
The odds are that we will see Citibank
and the offices of other out-of-town banks
in west Michigan in a few years. Aside
from that, the types of deregulation that
were possible have occurred.
The cycle of deregulation is not over,
however. We are seeing increased bank
and thrift failures due to excesses, poor
judgment, adverse markets, and the Iikee
While some of that was to be expected,
it may also mean that deregulation may
have gone too far. But that's another
story.

